Hannah Arendt’s work is an important reference for Paul Ricœur. Her definition of power as the free action in concert of individuals within a community of equals, guaranteed by institutions, allows Ricœur to ground his reflection on the political dimension of recognition and justice. However, as I will show in this paper, such a definition is problematic, particularly because of the relation that Arendt establishes between power and authority, her decision to separate the social and the political, and her understanding (...) of ideology, philosophy, and common sense in politics. After describing Arendt’s account of the relation between power and authority, I argue that, without rejecting the spirit of her political thought or her basic concepts, Ricœur’s reflections on the functions of ideology in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia offer a broader but complementary vision that allows us to understand the issues that remain obscure in Arendt’s approach. -/- Résumé: L’œuvre de Hannah Arendt constitue une référence importante pour Paul Ricœur. La définition arendtienne du pouvoir comme agir ensemble des individus au sein d’une communauté d’égaux garantie par des institutions, fournit en effet à Ricœur les bases de sa réflexion sur la dimension politique de la reconnaissance et de la justice. Cependant, cet article s’efforce de montrer qu’une telle définition est problématique, non seulement en raison de la relation qu’Arendt établit entre le pouvoir et l’autorité, mais aussi en ce qui concerne sa distinction du social et du politique, sa compréhension de l’idéologie, ainsi que sa conception de la philosophie et du sens commun dans le domaine politique. Après une analyse des thèses d’Arendt sur la relation entre le pouvoir et l’autorité, cet article soutient que, sans rejeter l’esprit de la pensée politique arendtienne et ses concepts de base, la conception ricœurienne des fonctions de l’idéologie développée dans L’idéologie et l’utopie offre une vision plus ample et plus complète qui permet d’éclairer les questions qui demeurent obscures dans l’approche de Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

Higher education institutes both foster the advancement of knowledge and address society's socioeconomic and environmental challenges. To fulfil these multiple missions requires significant changes to how the role of a researcher is perceived e.g. a researcher identity that is congruent with the objective of contributing to fundamental knowledge while also engaging with non-academic actors, broadly, and entrepreneurship, in particular. We argue that the early stages of an academic career—namely the PhD training trajectory—and the knowledge networks formed during this period have (...) a major influence on the scientist’s future capacity to develop an appropriate researcher role identity. We draw on knowledge network and identity theories to investigate how the knowledge networks (i.e. business, scientific and career knowledge networks) of PhD students promote changes to, reinforce or conflict with the perception of a researcher role identity. Our longitudinal qualitative network study includes PhD students and their supervisors funded by the H2020 FINESSE project. At the network level, we show that scientific knowledge is distributed equally throughout young academics’ networks but that entrepreneurial (business) and career knowledge tend to be concentrated around certain individuals in these networks. On the PhD student level, we observe different pronunciations of the researcher role identity linked to students’ interactions with their knowledge networks. We distinguish identity conflicts due to misalignment between ego and alters which leads to withdrawal from the network. Our findings have practical implications and suggest that universities and PhD student supervisors should support PhD students to develop a researcher identity which is in line with the individual PhD student’s expectations. (shrink)

The present volume collects contributions which contextualize Fichte’s theory of image in various respects, focusing on its relation to pre-modern theories of image, its changing role in the development of Fichte’s thinking and its place within Fichte’s foundation of philosophy in the area between theory of truth or validity and ontology. Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge, die Fichtes Bildtheorie in verschiedenen Hinsichten kontextualisieren, wobei ihr Verhältnis zu prä-modernen Bildtheorien, ihre wechselnde Rolle in der Entwicklung von Fichtes Denken und ihre im (...) Spannungsfeld von Wahrheits- bzw. Geltungstheorie und Ontologie angesiedelte Stellung in Fichtes Grundlegung der Philosophie im Mittelpunkt stehen. (shrink)

With reference to Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology (PoM) in my paper I will address three points, namely: To what extent Schelling’s PoM provides us with arguments in favour of 1. Realism, 2. Emergentism and 3. Documentality (Ferraris 2009). Accordingly, in the first section, Reality, I will present Schelling’s PoM as realism, arguing that in mythology Schelling finds the traces of the developing of consciousness, regarded as a real fact. But, as this latter can only be real if having a history, (...) i.e. if emerging from a previous natural status, which is devoid of any consciousness, PoM should be regarded as strongly related with a sort of emergentism. This will thus be the object of the second section, where I will investigate the genetic interpretation of Schelling’s Weltalter proposed by Wolfram Hogrebe (Hogrebe 1989) and suggest that precisely this analysis of the Weltalter explains also why Schelling’s project couldn’t but fail. In fact, against its intention, the Weltalter, as it was trying to explain the rise of semantics together with it the true genesis of the our acknowledgment of the world, still remains affected by an idealistic stance and hence couldn’t succeed in becoming positive philosophy. Eventually, in the third section of this paper, Documentality, I argue, that a solution of the problems left open by Schelling’s Weltalter and positively addressed in the PoM is offered by the interpretation of this latter as a contribution to Documentality. Even if created before and apparently independently from the act writing, in fact mythology relies on the possibility of recording tales, hence it is made of and eventually ends up in a written corpus. This means that the consciousness mythology gives us an account of, is the one that for the first time is able to present itself in narrated tales. It is not the mere possibility of acknowledging something, but in fact the possibility of binding our will to a freely formulated law trough our memory, i.e. the birth of conscience upon consciousness, which is the real sense of religion. In this sense Ferraris’ concept of documentality provides us an important theoretical framework to understand the hidden presuppositions of Schelling’s PoM and to relate this latter to its realistic and emergentistic character. (shrink)

In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an (...) investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske’s account of information flow. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a set-theoretical interpretation of the logical square of opposition, in the perspective opened by generalized quantifier theory. Generalized quantifiers allow us to account for the semantics of quantificational Noun Phrases, and of other natural language expressions, in a coherent and uniform way. I suggest that in the analysis of the meaning of Noun Phrases and Determiners the square of opposition may help representing some semantic features responsible to different logical properties of these expressions. I will (...) conclude with some consideration on scope interactions between quantifiers. (shrink)

Since Stalbaum’s 1838 translation revived interest in Plato’s Timaeus, commentators have tended to bracket the discourse on Necessity, reading it as either mythical or mystical. This essay offers an interpretation of Necessity that is also an assertion of its importance for understanding the philosophically important conception of chora-space found therein. Beginning with throwing ourselves back into the Presocratic milieu, I examine what remains of Presocratic notions of kreon and ananke (necessity) in order to move forward a more robust interpretation of (...) the discourse on Necessity and chora-space. (shrink)

Fichte’s Doctrine of Science of 1811 offers a sound model for explaining the conditions of semantics in its connection with the idea of freedom. Following Wolfram Hogrebe’s suggestion that the principle of contradiction works as an archaeological semantic postulate, i.e., is the implicit condition for any sentence to be meaningful, we argue that in Fichte’s definition of the phenomenon we find such a semantic postulate at a higher genetic level than the principle of contradiction indicated by Hogrebe. Moreover, the Doctrine (...) of Science of 1811 offers an analysis of the steps through which this phenomenon displays itself – i.e. Vermögen, als, Soll – which can be understood as the conditions for establishing a meaningful sentence. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1811 kann uns einen soliden Modell zur Erklärung der Entstheung von Semantik anbieten. Mein Beitrag fangt mit der Darstellung Wolfram Hogrebes Hypothese an, dass der Satz vom Widerspruch als archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat fungiert, d.h. als implizite Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglicher bedeutenden Äußerung. Ausgehend dieser Idee Hogrebes, hier schlage ich vor, dass man im Fichtes Begriffe der Erscheinung ein genetisch höheres archäologisches Bedeutungspostulat als der Satz vom Widerspruch finden kann. Daraufhin bietet die Wissenschaftslehre 1811 einen Einsicht in alle Schritte, wodurch die Erscheinung sich entfaltet – Vermögen, Durch, Als, Soll – die wir als die entsprechende Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines bedeutungsvollen Satzes verstehen können. (shrink)

The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how (...) Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle. (shrink)

This essay is about experience, and not only about ideas. I have been drawn to write about John Cameron Mitchell’s Shortbus for a number of reasons: First, I find his work to be part of a new turn in LGBT art and media that take queer lives as a point of departure, and not only as narrative focus, for their work. These areworks that are not just about being queer, but cross the line into being queer works. Of those who (...) can be said to be a part of this recent turn, I find Mitchell’s work to be both especially philosophical and formally interesting. Not only does his work take up philosophical questions over what it means to be human, and the nature of love and sex, but also his works are produced through an organic, cooperative process that re-frames what it could mean to queer representation, political or otherwise. (shrink)

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

Dans la discussion sur l’abstraction ( Super De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3), Thomas d’Aquin donne quatre exemples de parties constitutives de l’homme. L’un de ces exemples, tel qu’il apparaît dans l’autographe de Thomas, serait « ce feu » ; toutefois cette variante n’est pas retenue dans l’édition léonine, qui opte plutôt pour la conjecture « cet ongle ». J. F. Wippel a récemment proposé de garder la variante « ce feu » ; le présent article vise à corroborer la (...) proposition de Wippel. (shrink)

Può un’opera d’arte non avere proprietà estetiche? Può l’arte essere definita, e compresa, senza alcun riferimento all’estetico? Fino a qualche tempo fa, una riposta affermativa a queste due domande sembrava inevitabile: le cosiddette Teorie Estetiche dell’arte, per le quali le opere d’arte sono prodotte con l’intenzione di suscitare esperienze estetiche (soprattutto per il tramite delle proprietà estetiche), mostravano tutti i loro limiti di fronte alle nuove tendenze artistiche, come ad ese...

RESUMEN En este trabajo discutimos tres formulaciones semánticas del condicional: la material, la estricta y la relevante. Defendemos que, desde un punto de vista formal, el condicional relevante responde mejor a nuestras intuiciones que los otros dos. Ahora bien, dado que la interpretación semántica del mismo es terreno disputado, proponemos hacerlo pragmáticamente. Dividimos el texto en tres secciones. En la primera proponemos el criterio de adecuación para evaluar distintas teorías de los condicionales: la teoría no debe dar lugar a los (...) casos más conocidos de sobregeneración inferencial. En la segunda mostramos que el condicional material y el condicional estricto sobregeneran, pues ambos admiten paradojas bien conocidas. En la última mostramos que si se interpreta pragmáticamente, el condicional relevante bloquea la aparición de las paradojas que los dos anteriores no pueden evitar, y, en esa medida responde mejor que ellos al criterio establecido y, por tanto, a nuestras intuiciones. ABSTRACT In this paper we discuss three semantic formulations of conditional: material, strict and relevant. Our aim is to show that the relevant conditional shapes our intuitions better than the other two. Since the semantic interpretation of the relevant conditional is an unsettled issue nowadays, we propose a pragmatic interpretation of it. In the first part of the paper we present the criteria to which a theory of conditionals must answer, i.e. the theory must not overgenerate. In the second one, we show that the material and the strict conditionals overgenerate because both lead to paradoxes. In the last part we show that the relevant conditional with a pragmatic interpretation solves the problem of the other conditionals. (shrink)

El artículo presenta un análisis comparativo de los últimos parágrafos de la Vida de Pirrón de Diógenes Laercio (9.107-8) y de un capítulo del Adversus ethicos de Sexto Empírico ( _M_ 11.[5].141-67). Los resultados de este análisis harán plausible la hipótesis de una fuente común, reproducida parcialmente en DL, pero elaborada y refinada en Sexto. En ambos textos son centrales las nociones de fin y de elección. Se presentan las diferencias entre ambos textos entorno a la primera, y las tensiones (...) internas co munes que implica el tratamiento de la segunda. (shrink)

Este artículo examina cómo la separabilidad y unidad mente-cuerpo resultan clave para poner de manifiesto lo inapropiado del “teatro cartesiano”, metáfora creada por Daniel Dennett para criticar la experiencia consciente unificada en Descartes. La primera sección introduce al problema de la separabilidad cartesiana. La segunda examina cómo mente y cuerpo, separables mediante lo concebible según Descartes, resultan ser cosas metafísicamente distintas. La tercera enfatiza como separables no implica separados. La última sección enfatiza el argumento de la dis-analogía del piloto y (...) el navío, y cómo, según el filósofo francés, aunque separables, mente y cuerpo son substancias estrechamente unidas, formando un ens per se. En vista de este, criticamos la metáfora del “teatro cartesiano” de Dennett: es imposible que la mente sea un espectador, puesto que la experiencia consciente ya es unificada e incluso somatizada. Notamos, por último, que pese a Dennett, hay investigadores de la Ciencia Cognitiva que coinciden con Descartes en relación con la estrecha unión mente-cuerpo, i.e., quienes defienden que la mente es encarnada, incrustada o incluso extendida. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo desarrollo la idea de Gadamer de que el gusto tiene una dimensión más moral que estética. A partir de esta tesis, apoyado en Aristóteles y Paul Ricoeur, trataré de mostrar que, efectivamente, en la experiencia que es el fenómeno del gusto discernimos unas cosas respecto de otras, hacemos distinciones que rebasan con mucho la mera dimensión estética, y nos instalamos en las dimensiones ética y política de la vida humana.In this article I develop Gadamer’s idea on (...) taste having a greater moral dimension than an aesthetic one. From this thesis, and relying on Aristotle and Paul Ricoeur, I aim to demonstrate that it is, in effect, in the experience of the phenomenon of taste where we are able to discern certain things from other; where we make distinctions which go way beyond the mere aesthetic dimension, and place ourselves in the ethical and political dimensions of human life. (shrink)

Según John Searle, las posiciones _por defecto_, _i. e_., las condiciones de inteligibilidad del pensamiento y la acción son algunos _puntos de partida_ que se presuponen de manera pre-reflexiva y pragmática. Su postulación es, además, una novel manera de tratar con algunos problemas perennes de la filosofía, dejándolos entre paréntesis. Dichos problemas son la existencia del mundo externo, la verdad y como esta tiene que ver con hechos, la percepción directa, los significados de las palabras y, finalmente, la causalidad. En (...) este artículo analizamos cómo las mencionadas posiciones conforman una humanidad _por defecto_, y cómo su ausencia, _deshumanizaría_. Esto es relevante en el caso de la cooperación, una posición _por defecto_ básica para la intencionalidad colectiva, y piedra angular de la civilización humana. (shrink)

I examine the relation between sensation and discursive thought in Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus. In Theaetetus, a soul whose highest faculty was sensation would have no unified experience of the sensible world, lacking universal ideas to give order to the sensible flux. It is implied that such universals are grasped by the soul’s thinking. In Plotinus the soul is not passive when it senses the world, but as the logos of all things it thinks the world through its own forms.Proclus (...) argues against the derivation of universal logoi from the senses, which alone can’t make the sensible world comprehensible. At most they give a record of the original sense-impression in its particularity. The soul’s own projected logoi give the sensible world stability. For Proclus, bare sensation does not depend on thought, but a unified experience of the sense-world depends on its paradigmatic logoi in our souls. (shrink)

Si c’est avec le bouddhisme que l’Inde entre véritablement dans l’histoire, tant dans l’histoire de la philosophie que dans celle des événements et lieux mémorables, pour la première fois gravée sur la pierre et le rocher – une donnée à la fois remarquable et problématique –, la perception d’une Inde compacte et quelque peu isolée dans l’ensemble du monde a longtemps encouragé une vision incomplète de la civilisation indienne et de son passé. On constate que les grands changements s’accompagn...

Le traité Περὶ θείων ὀνομάτων de l’élève de Proclus dissimulé sous le nom de ‘Denys l’Aréopagite’— traité qui a été récemment édité en qualité de premier titre de la série Corpus Dionysiacum— est subdivisé en deux grandes parties par un excursus fameux sur le problème de la substantialité des maux. Dans la première partie, contenant les chapitres I-III, l’auteur discute la possibilité des prédications dont l’objet est le premier principe. Dans la deuxième, contenant les chapitres V-XIII, il en présente les (...) ‘noms’. Les deux parties sont séparées par le long excursus sur la nature du mal, qui forme l’objet du chapitre IV. Ce dernier s’ouvre, il est vrai, sur le propos d’examiner la dénomination de ‘Bien’ attribuée au premier principe , si bien que l’on rangerait volontiers ce chapitre dans la deuxième partie, consacrée à la présentation des ‘noms’ de Dieu et à leur commentaire. Il se trouve pourtant que l’auteur a explicitement placé la charnière principale de son traité après l’excursus sur la nature du mal. Au début du chapitre V, en effet, il déclare aborder la question de l’οὑσιωνυμία divine, en démontrant par là concevoir le ‘Bien’ comme une dénomination différente de toute autre, voire antérieure à tous les noms qui sont en relation avec l’οὑσία, et dont l’examen occupe les chapitres V-XIII. (shrink)

Des présocratiques à Plotin en passant par Socrate, Platon, Aristote, Epicure et les stoïciens, Jean-François Mattéi nous convie à un voyage initiatique dans la philosophie antique. C'est à cette source que la raison occidentale se nourrit depuis des siècles. On y assiste à la naissance de la philosophie, de la physique, des mathématiques, de la politique : éblouissant feu d'artifice de la pensée comme l'histoire en a peu connu depuis lors, et qui continue de résonner dans les débats d'aujourd'hui. En (...) fin pédagogue, Jean-François Mattéi construit des ponts entre hier et maintenant, fidèle à la formule qui fait le succès de la série "Une histoire personnelle de...". (shrink)

L'intersecnonnalité est devenue en quelques années un concept central aussi bien en sciences sociales qu'au sein des luttes sociales en particulier féministes. Forgée pour penser l'imbrication des rapports de domination l'intersectionnalité constitue aujourd'hui un champ d'études et d'expérimenta rions théoriques foisonnant. Pour la première fois en France des universitaires abordent ses multiples dimensions épistémologigues. théoriques. poli tiques et les recherches récentes qu'elle a permis d'ouvrir dans des espaces aussi différents que la France, l'Amérique latine ou l'Europe de l'Est. Que peut (...) nous offrir cette notion pour penser le genre la théorie féministe et les mobilisations sociales? Comment contribuer à pro mouvoir un usage de l'intersectionnalité qui renforce son potentiel critique et insurgé", plutôt que figé sur des identités? Cet ouvrage témoigne à partir d'exemples de la force d'un tel outil lorsqu'il s'agit d'éclairer des processus sociaux et politiques complexes. En offrant un regard à la fois rétrospectif et contemporain sur les enjeux politiques de la production d'un savoir intersectionnel, il veut aussi montrer que l'intersection naine n'est pas seulement un agencement de critique théorique indispensable mais aussi une plate forme à partir de laquelle construire des sujets poli tiques collectifs nécessaires au projet d'émancipation féministe et de la société."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and Mcginn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind body-problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.

Essai d'interprétation réaliste de la Mécanique Quantique, le nouveau réalisme scientifique professé par ce livre est un réalisme ouvert, conforme aux potentialités du réel. Ce réalisme dépasse l'étroitesse du réalisme intuitif, ainsi que la naïveté du positivisme. Prendre aujourd'hui parti en faveur du réalisme scientifique, c'est prendre parti en faveur d'une conception du monde rationnel, fondé sur les acquis des sciences.

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

CONTENTS: -/- SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 -/- SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? -/- Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione (...) mereologica Stefano Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 -/- SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO -/- Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 -/- SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE -/- La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359 . (shrink)

reto de un jurista que urge a la razón individual de cada lector para que éste verifique por sí mismo la falacia de las modas ideológicas en las que puede hallarse eventual e inconscientemente inmerso. El autor ha pretendido hacer un libro «sensato», es decir, de sentido común o «buen juicio», que es una manera de sabiduría llana y común; todo lo contrario de la sensacional originalidad que suele estragar al público de nuestros días. Aunque quizás ocurra hoy que lo (...) sensato resulte ser excepcional y nuevo, es lo más conforme al auténtico estilo de un jurista, que, por su profesión, nunca busca destacar por su singularidad, sino por la conveniente edificación crítica del derecho fundado sobre una tradición respetable. Como hay un arte de ser sencillo, hay también un arte de ser sensato, y a esa «sagesse» aspira precisamente el autor. I. Naturaleza. II. Verdad. III. Patrimonio. IV. Potestad. V. Persona. VI. Matrimonio. VII. Servicio. Índice tópico. Referencias bibliográficas complementarias. (shrink)

Lors des fouilles des années 1990-1991 sur l'agora d'Argos, on a découvert un puits qui avait été construit au milieu ou dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle ap. J.-C. et abandonné au moment de la destruction des principaux bâtiments de l'agora. Utilisé ensuite comme dépotoir, il fut très vite comblé, peut-être en quelques années : son remplissage, très homogène, date du début du Ve siècle ap. J.-C. Cet ensemble clos contient une centaine de lampes entières ou fragmentaires, près de (...) 80 vases des types différents (amphores, cruches, marmites, etc.), ainsi que de nombreux fragments de céramique, de vaisselle de verre et d'autres objets. Il semble que le puits, une fois abandonné, ne servit pas seulement de dépotoir mais aussi d'endroit où l'on pratiquait des rites magiques. C'est ce qu'atteste la trouvaille de tablettes d'envoûtement en plomb, qui sont malheureusement mal conservées et n'ont pas pu être lues. Les nombreuses lampes provenant du puits ont également été utilisées dans des rites magiques. (shrink)

Depuis une vingtaine d'annees, on assiste un peu partout a un regain d'interet pour les ecrits socratiques de Xenophon. Que Xenophon ne nous donne pas davantage que Platon un portrait historiquement fiable de Socrate peut etre considere comme un acquis de la critique du XXe siecle. Laissant transparaitre dans son temoignage des options profondement differentes de celles de Platon, Xenophon temoigne par la meme, cependant, des tensions, voire des oppositions qui traversaient le milieu socratique autour du souvenir et de la (...) comprehension de la personne de Socrate: cette seule consideration suffit a faire de Xenophon une source essentielle pour notre connaissance de l'immediat apres Socrate et, par dela, pour notre intelligence de l'histoire de la reception de Socrate dans les siecles ulterieurs. Le colloque dont sont issues les etudes rassemblees dans ce volume, organise a l'Universite de Provence (Aix-Marseille I) du 6 au 9 novembre 2003, s'inscrit dans cette perspective. Plus qu'un bilan de la nouvelle orientation des etudes xenophontiennes, qu'il est encore trop tot pour etablir, on y verra l'illustration de la diversite d'approches dont est susceptible le temoignage de Xenophon sur Socrate. Due a Louis-Andre Dorion, une bibliographie des etudes sur les ecrits socratiques de Xenophon publiees dans le dernier quart de siecle temoigne de la vitalite retrouvee de ce domaine de recherche. (shrink)

Argentina fue el primer país del mundo en establecer que los organismos que resulten de nuevas técnicas de edición genética (GE, en sus siglas en inglés) no estarán alcanzados por la normativa para Organismos Genéticamente Modificados (OGM), siempre y cuando una primera evaluación concluya que no incluye ADN de otra especie. Esto es relevante porque las evaluaciones para comercializar un OGM son tan extensas y costosas que solo son accesibles para unas pocas empresas multinacionales, que monopolizan la innovación fundamental, las (...) licencias y los productos derivados. Esta simplificación regulatoria coincide con el descubrimiento de técnicas como CRISPR-Cas9, mucho más baratas y simples que las previas, y con potencial para desarrollarse con reducidos presupuestos de investigación. Este trabajo indaga cómo el Estado argentino utiliza la legislación sobre biotecnología para fomentar la investigación, el desarrollo y la innovación (I+D+i), indagando en los límites y posibilidades de esta estrategia. Para ello se basa en la legislación y las políticas públicas competentes; observaciones en reuniones y conferencias biotecnológicas; y en entrevistas semi-estructuradas realizadas durante 2019 a científicos y empresarios que trabajaban con CRISPR. Así, encuentra que la legislación opera como fomento para los desarrollos locales, pero las ventajas que ofrecen las nuevas técnicas de edición genética dependen de una serie de acciones y estrategias geopolíticas. Entendiendo por regulación al conjunto de acciones y omisiones de los actores interesados, a escala mundial y con intereses contrapuestos, la investigación concluye que es esta regulación geopolítica la que condiciona la innovación biotecnológica en Argentina. Así, la posibilidad de aprovechar esa “ventana de oportunidad” que habilitan las nuevas técnicas descansa en una serie de variables que configuran nuevas relaciones de interdependencia global. (shrink)

El presente trabajo, estudia de forma sintética, la metodología y criterios utilizados en los países capitalistas (en este caso el Análisis Beneficio Costo) y socialistas en la cuantificación del excedente generado por las actividades de I+D, en el sector agropecuario como parte del desarrollo sostenible, o sea, la cuestión que se propone analizar es ¿será posible cuantificar el capital ambiental que tiende a ser escaso? ¿Cómo o con que precios evaluar las externalidades? ¿Será que la ciencia económica (en este caso (...) a través de la evaluación de proyectos agropecuarios) tiene alguna respuesta convincente de cómo asignar recursos no renovables? (shrink)

βρυχεδανς : πολυφγος, ο δ μακρς. For μακρς read μργος. ζγγος· τν μελισσν χος, κα τν μοων. L. and S. translate literally, ‘humming of bees, etc.’; but to buzz or hum is not a common property of insects, it is peculiar to a few. For τν μοων I suggest τν μυιν. ζγγος refers especially to the buzz, or ‘ping’, of a mosquito , LL. zanzara; cf. Cassiodorus ‘Ciniphes genus est culicum, fixis aculeis permolestum, quas vulgus consuevit vocare zinzalas’; and in (...) the Appendix, De Wit adds: ‘zinzala; parva musca, id est culex; unde zinzalarium, conopeum ad eas arcendas, Gloss. Ugut. ’—i.e. a mosquito-net. Culex, by the way, is an interesting and a homely word; we lack mosquitoes in Scotland, but we know the angry bite of a ‘horse-fly’ and call it a ‘cleg’. (shrink)

Line 2 has puzzled editors: ‘The significance of the name is beyond knowledge’ ; ‘Hie versus inter difHcillimos Properti est’ . It should mean, ‘a door known to the chastity of Tarpeia’, i.e. ‘known to Tarpeia when she was still chaste‘, i.e. ‘known to Tarpeia as a girl’; and I suggest it means just that.

En este artículo se quiere trazar una teoría política de la insurrección en el pensamiento de Max Stirner, en tanto alternativa ética y política a la revolución. Se mostrará cómo, según el pensador alemán, la revolución es en última instancia una estrategia fallida de emancipación en tanto en cuanto no libera al individuo de las formas de subjetividad que lo mantienen dependiente del poder. Más en general, se enseñará como el orden liberal post-revolucionario, detrás del lenguaje secular de los derechos, (...) las libertades y la igualdad, engendra técnicas más sutiles de gobernabilidad del individuo. La insurrección, en cambio, puede ser vista como un rechazo de las identidades y de los roles que disciplinan al individuo. Al respecto, se prestará una atención especial al concepto stirneriano de Eigenheit, como estrategia ética de auto-determinación y liberación de las formas rígidas de la subjetividad. En última instancia, se querrá mostrar cómo todo el proyecto político de la insurrección stirneriana se basa en un anarquismo ontológico que rechaza la lógica teleocrática del racionalismo moderno y pone en entredicho la misma noción de realización. The aim of this article to outline a political theory of insurrection in Max Stirner’s thought as an ethical and political alternative to revolution. I will show that revolution is ultimately a failed strategy of emancipation as it does not free the individual from the forms of subjectivity that keep her dependent on power. Insurrection, on the other hand, can be seen as a rejection of the identities and roles that discipline the individual. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the Stirnerian concept of Eigenheit as an ethical strategy of self-determination and liberation from rigid forms of subjectivity. Ultimately, I will show how the whole political project of the Stirnerian insurrection is based on an ontological anarchism that rejects the teleocratic logic of modern rationalism and calls into question the very notion of realization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ad UnguemArmand J. D'Angour vos, oPompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite, quod nonmulta dies et multa litura coercuit atquepraesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.(Horace Ars Poetica 291–94) You, OSons of Pompilius, condemn that poem whichmany a day and many an erasure has not pruned andwhittled down and chastened tenfold to the nail."Censure a poem," Brink paraphrases, "which has not been reduced to right proportions and (when it has been reduced) has (...) not been tested to a nicety."1 Tested, that is, by its author, whose action Horace has been thought here to be likening to the way a sculptor examines a completed work for flaws. Translations of the final line commonly expand the phrase ad unguem to specify such a connotation, often taking praesectum to qualify unguem as in "to meet the test of the well–pared nail."2 But Brink has advanced convincing arguments against the supposition that praesectum qualifies unguem.3 Moreover, praesectum is positioned for emphasis and followed directly by deciens: the words must elaborate the process described by the foregoing coercuit.4Praesectum [End Page 411] thus picks up carmen, and no reference to the artisan's manicure should be supposed.5Ad unguem remains as a self–contained expression, to be understood in its own right.The image introduced in the following lines has been thought to present a deliberate point of contrast in the matter of the sculptor's fingernails:ingenium misera quia fortunatius artecredit et excludit sanos Helicone poetasDemocritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat,non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.(AP 295–98)Because Democritus believes that it's luckier to possess talentthan mere skill, and denies a place on Helicon to sane poets,a good number of artists make a point of not cutting their nailsor trimming their beards, but head for secret haunts and avoid baths.Despite the verbal echo, the change of tone and context at this point rules out any straightforward association of the unguem in line 294 with the ungues in line 297.6 Horace's humorous sketch of those "artistic types" who model their insalubrious habits on a superficial view of Democritean inspiration initiates a new section of the poem.7 It looks forward to a fuller consideration of the relative value of ars and ingenium, about which in due course Horace gives his opinion as follows:natura fieret laudabile carmen an artequaesitum est. ego nec studium sine divite venanec rude quid possit video ingenium; alterius sicaltera poscit opem res et coniurat amice.(AP 408–11) [End Page 412]The question is: Is good poetry due to nature or art?I myself fail to see what artistry can achieve without a rich vein of natural ability,or raw talent without application, to such a degree does the one attributedraw upon the other and make common cause with it.The only other instance of ad unguem in Horace is in Satires 1.5, where the phrase similarly appears tout court, conjoined to a past participle in a construction which parallels praesectum... ad unguem as construed above: interea Maecenas advenit atqueCocceius Capitoque simul Fonteius, ad unguemfactus homo, Antoni non ut magis alter amicus.(Sat. 1.5.31–33) Meanwhile Maecenas arrives andCocceius, and with them Fonteius Capito, a manof such consummate charm that Antony holds none dearer.Whether ad unguem here refers to physical or intellectual refinement (or both), the connotation "to perfection" is evident. Commentators ancient and modern have generally supposed that the metaphor is best explained by the image which Persius, writing around a century later, developed in his First Satire:quis populi sermo est? quis enim, nisi carmina mollinunc demum numero fluere, ut per leve severoseffundat iunctura ungues?(Sat. 1.63–65)"What's the word from the general public? "What else, but thatnow at last there are verses so fluent that no join jars criticalfingernails as they glide across the smooth surface.In commenting on AP 294, Ps.–Acro adduced this precisely evocative idea of "critical fingernails" for Horace's use of ad unguem:"ad unguem": tractum a... (shrink)

Cet article a pour objet la synthèse et la critique faites par Arnau de Vilanova, dans le Gladius iugulans thomatistas, des thèses de Thomas d’Aquin sur la possibilité de connaître la fin des temps. De surcroît, nous établirons sa contextualisation dans le cadre de la controverse entre le médecin catalan, Jean Vigorós et Martin d’Ateca. Le fragment mentionné est édité avec trois passages supplémentaires ; une description détaillée du ms. Canon. Misc. 370 (Bodleian Library, Oxford) est également fournie.

ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, (...) I argue that it is reasonable to accept induction.RÉSUMÉ: Depuis que Hume a soulevé le problème de l’induction, nombreux ont été les philosophes qui se sont attaqués à cette question. Aucun, pourtant, n’y a jusqu’à présent apporté de réponse satisfaisante et susceptible d’entraîner l’adhésion générale. Selon Wilfrid Sellars, la raison de cet échec est que les tentatives de justification se fondaient sur des raisonnements théoriques plutôt que pratiques. L’auteur offre ici une sorte de solution «sellarsienne» au problème. À partir du principe instrumental et de la conception constructiviste de la justification épistémique, l’auteur tente de démontrer qu’il est raisonnable d’accepter l’induction. (shrink)

En el siguiente artículo se presenta una investigación filosófica acerca de la conformación ontológica delmundo virtual. Esta es un aporte teórico al debate contemporáneo de la filosofía de la computación sobrela caracterización ontológica de la computación digital y sus productos emergentes, ya que se propone unaaproximación a este campo de estudio desde la perspectiva filosófica de Nicolaï Hartmann. El objetivo principal del presente artículo es explicar la estratificación del mundo virtual a partir de la teoría ontológica de estratos y categorías (...) de Hartmann. Para cumplir con este objetivo se procedió a una revisión crítica del estado de la cuestión de la ontología filosófica de la virtualidad. Luego se procedió a presentar una propuesta de estratificación y categorización denominada ‘La fábrica del mundo virtual’ que es una ontología hermenéutica de la virtualidad digital basada en los postulados de Hartmann. Las principales conclusiones alcanzadas son: i) La emergencia de la realidad del mundo virtual se encuentra constituida de los mismos estratos que conforman la esfera del conocimiento del mundo real: material, orgánico, psíquico y social. ii) La realidad virtual es un producto de la computación que ocurre en la esfera del conocimiento en el que existe intervención de la esfera ideal y de la esfera del mundo real. (shrink)

Robert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop (...) and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously. -/- RÉSUMÉ: Robert Brandom soutient une «théorie pragmatique et phénomenaliste» de la connaissance. Selon cette théorie, nous devons comprendre notre notion de justification d'après un modèle sellarsien de la pratique sociale, et il n'y a rien d'autre dans phénomène de connaissance que la pertinence de «prendre-pour-connaître». Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec ces deux opinions. Mais la thèse de Brandom est si sommaire qu'il n'est pas évident de savoir comment elle peut trailer les nombreux problèmes discutés en épistémologie contemporaine. Le but principal de cet article est de développer et défendre une théorie pragmatique et phénomenaliste de la connaissance en résolvant ces problèmes. Je soutiens, en particulier, que cette théorie peut s'accorder en même temps à lerçon du problème de Gettier et au «fiabilisme». (shrink)

In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle (...) in the sense that it provides correctness conditions for moral laws, rather than providing specific moral laws.Dans sa deuxième Critique, Kant affirme que la loi morale se donne comme un fait de raison. Dans cet article, contrairement à la position standard, nous prétendons qu’il existe une autre façon — non dogmatique — de défendre cette affirmation. Par ailleurs, le principe de moralité de Kant est largement considéré comme étant formel. Comment un tel principe formel peut-il être réconcilié avec notre fin morale substantielle? Nous soutenons également que le principe de moralité de Kant peut être interprété comme un principe formel dans le sens où il fournit des conditions d’acceptabilité pour les lois morales, et non des lois morales spécifiques. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a rejoinder to the criticisms raised by Jimmy Alfonso Licon in “No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales.” I argue that Licon's concerns are misplaced, and that his hypothetical presentist time machine neither travels in time nor saves the life of the putative traveler. I conclude that sensible time travel is still forbidden to presentists.

ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...) recourse to any evidence about his behaviour; and someone’s belief is unconscious if it is not conscious.RÉSUMÉ: Dans un récent article, D. H. Finkelstein propose une nouvelle distinction entre croyance consciente et inconsciente. Suivant cette proposition, la croyance de quelqu’un est consciente s’il a la capacité de l’exprimer tout simplement en se l’attribuant; sa croyance est inconsciente s’il n’en a pas la capacité. Dans cet article, je fais valoir que cette proposition est inadéquate, et je propose ensuite une nouvelledistinction. Suivant cette distinction, la croyance de quelqu’un est consciente s’il s’attribue cette croyance sans s’appuyer sur aucun élément de preuve au sujet de son comportement; sa croyance est inconsciente si elle n’est pas consciente. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUBSTANTIAL UNITY OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ACCORDING TO JOHN POINSOT JOHN D. KRONEN The University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota EVERY SUBSTANCE metaphysician must answer several difficult questions peculiar to his or her ontology. In this paper I will examine John Poinsot's answer to two of these questions, one concerning the nature of the form of substantial composites, and one concerning which material objects are substantial composites. I (...) shall argue that Poinsot's answers to these questions show the untenability of a structuralist view of substantial form and of a reductive materialist view of living beings. But before considering these questions I must briefly outline Poinsot's view of what the general nature of substance is, as explained in his treatise on material logic.1 Poinsot's Account of Substance in General In the section of his Material Logic concerned with the categories Poinsot gives a succinct account of the nature of substance 1 Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus; vol. I, Ars logicae prima et secunda pars, ed. P. Beato Reiser (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1820), Q. XV, pp. 523-527. It should be noted that I am not concerned in this paper with describing either the psychological origin of the notion of substance, or of justifying it against phenomenalism. My only aim is to show how such a view of substance leads to a certain notion of form when it is applied, so to speak, to material objects. For an interesting account of the origin of the concept of substance in Poinsot see John Deely, Tractatus De Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), p. 86, n. 16. Deely takes it that Poinsot has a deeper categorial scheme than that of Aristotle from which the latter's scheme "emerges," as it were. In this article, then, I am not concerned with that deeper scheme which Deely refers to in this interesting note. 599 600 JOHN D. KRONEN in general and of its relation to the supposit and to the act of existing. He notes that by " substance " narrowly considered is meant that kind of essence to "which it is due to exist in itself as opposed to that kind to which it is due to exist in another" (i.e., an accident).2 He defends this as the primary " definition " 3 of substance against the other definition of it which is " that which stands under accidents," on the grounds that a thing must exist in itself, at least ontologically speaking, before it can support accidents 4 and that to define substance as that which supports accidents is to define it in relation to other things, not itself. This point is important because many modern and contemporary philosophers who have attacked the notion of substance have done so by arguing that there are no beings which stand under accidents. For Poinsot this attack, even if successful, would show that there are no accidents, not that there are no substances. Poinsot insists that " substance " connotes a quiddity to which to exist in itself is due since actual existence does not belong to the essence of any created thing.5 Further, Poinsot insists that to exist in itself " connotes more than a mere negation of existing in another; rather it connotes a positive perfection." This is because to exist in a dependent way is to exist in an imperfect way, so to exist independently must be to exist in a more perfect way.6 Finally, Poinsot distinguishes between the substance and the supposit. The substance is the complete nature of the thing, while 2 Ibid., p. 523. a " Substance " as a supreme genus cannot strictly be defined since it cannot be differentiated from any higher genus. 4 Haec autem proprietas existendi per se intelligitur vel secundum considerationem absolutam et in ordine ad se, et sic dicitur subsistens, quasi non indignes alio ut sustentetur, sed in se sistens; vel dicitur secundum habitudinem ad alia, quatenus ilia sustentat in esse, et sic dicitur non solum subsistens, sed etiam substans. Ibid., p. 523. 5 ••• esse actu per se vel in alio non est ipsa quidditas substantiae vel accidentis, quia esse seu existere in nulla quidditate creata... (shrink)

Eduard Norden, in the second half of his Agnostos Theos, has maintained with great learning and ingenuity the thesis that predications in the style ‘Thou art ,’ ‘I am ,’ are due to Oriental influence; purely Greek religious language does not go beyond ‘Thou dost ,’ ‘We are indebted to thee for .’ This view appears to be substantially correct. To Oriental influence we may, I think, trace also the custom of stringing together a series of brief predications in or (...) of the second person, for the most part not connected by conjunctions, and producing the effect of a rapid fire of assertions. The earlier Greek examples are not, as a rule, asyndetic. In the Hellenistic age and later we see the other style, as in Catullus 34. 13: ‘tu Lucina dolentibus Iuno dicta puerperis, tu potens Triuia et notho es dicta lumine luna, tu cursu dea menstruo … exples’ 61. 51: ‘te suis tremulus parens inuocat, tibi uirgines zonula soluunt sinus, te timens cupida nouus captat aure maritus’; in Lucretius' proem; in Ovid, Met. IV. 17: ‘tibi enim inconsumpta iuuenta est, tu puer aeternus, tu formosissimus alto conspiceris caelo, tibi cum sine cornibus adstas, uirgineum caput est’; in the invocation of Apollo at the end of the first book of Statius' Thebaid; in Capaneus' prayer to his strong right arm : ; in the Orphic hymns, II. 10-, though they consist mostly of accumulations of epithets; in Menander Rhetor περ πιδειкν : περ [al. Θοραι], περ σ Θνδες, παρ σοкα σελνη τν ετνα λαμβνει; in Valerius Maximus VI. (shrink)